In-depth manual
Available interfaces¶
Pi-hole stats can be accessed via a standard Unix socket (/run/pihole/FTL.sock), a telnet-like connection (TCP socket on port 4711) as well as indirectly via the Web API (admin/api.php), and the command line (pihole -c -j). You can out find more details below.
Command-line arguments¶
debug- Don't go into daemon mode (stay in foreground) + more verbose loggingtest- StartFTLand process everything, but shut down immediately afterwardversion- Don't startFTL, only show the versiontag- Don't startFTL, show only git tagbranch- Don't startFTL, show only git branchFTLwas compiled fromno-daemonor-f- Don't go into background (daemon mode)helpor-h- Don't startFTL, show helpdnsmasq-test- Test resolver config file syntax--everything behind--will be passed as options to the internal resolver
Command-line arguments can be arbitrarily combined, e.g. pihole-FTL debug test
File locations¶
/var/log/pihole-FTL.loglog file/run/pihole-FTL.pidPID file/run/pihole-FTL.portfile containing port on whichFTLis listening/run/pihole/FTL.sockUnix socket
Linux capabilities¶
Capabilities (POSIX 1003.1e, capabilities(7)) provide fine-grained control over superuser permissions, allowing the use of the root user to be avoided.
To perform permission checks, traditional UNIX implementations distinguish two categories of processes: privileged processes (superuser or root), and unprivileged processes. Privileged processes bypass all kernel permission checks, while unprivileged processes are subject to full permission checking based on the process's credentials (user and group permissions and supplementary process capabilities). Capabilities are implemented on Linux using extended attributes (xattr(7)) in the security namespace. Extended attributes are supported by all major Linux file systems, including Ext2, Ext3, Ext4, Btrfs, JFS, XFS, and ReiserFS.
For your safety and comfort, pihole-FTL is run by the entirely unprivileged user pihole.
Whereas dnsmasq is running as root process, we designed pihole-FTL to be run by the entirely unprivileged user pihole. As a consequence, pihole-FTL will not be able to access the files of any other user on this system or mess around with your system's configuration.
However, this also implies that FTLDNS cannot bind to ports 53 (DNS) among some other necessary capabilities related to DHCP services. To establish a strong security model, we explicitly grant the pihole-FTL process additional capabilities so that pihole-FTL (but no other processes which may be started by pihole) can bind to port 53, etc., without giving any additional permissions to the pihole user.
We specifically add the following capabilities to pihole-FTL:
CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE: Allows FTLDNS binding to TCP/UDP sockets below 1024 (specifically DNS service on port 53)CAP_NET_RAW: use raw and packet sockets (we need a RAW socket for handling DHCPv6 requests)CAP_NET_ADMIN: modify routing tables and other network-related operations (to allow for handling DHCP requests)
Users that cannot use Linux capabilities for various reasons (lacking kernel or file system support) can modify the startup scripts of pihole-FTL to ensure the daemon is started as root. However, be aware that you do so on your own risk (although we don't expect problems to arise).